Death of a Mullah

You may have read of the death of Mullah Dadullah in Afghanistan, killed by U.S. soldiers. The western press called him the commander of Taliban forces in Southern Afghanistan, and reported his death as a severe blow to the Taliban. I recently interviewed Kabir Mohabbat, an Afghan American with extensive political, tribal, and family ties in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and got a very different picture of the situation.

Mr. Mohabbat works for the Department of Defense as a consultant on Afghan politics, culture, and language. Back in 1979, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, he had just graduated from a Midwestern university with a degree in political science. He went back to Afghanistan and became a high ranking member of the mujihadeen fighting the Soviets, in the process meeting many of the people involved in Afghani politics today, from Hamid Karzai to Mullah Omar, to Mullah Dadullah himself. For more background, read my previous post regarding Mr. Mohabbat’s activities.

Many Americans (including, at one point, President Bush) think of Islam as a monolithic religion. In fact, it has major and minor divisions within it, with some groups getting along and others at odds. Because of our invasion and occupation of Iraq, many people are now getting a grip on the concept that there are Sunnis and Shiites, and that they have fundamental religious, political, and social differences. I’d like to parse that one step finer, and point out that there are subsets of Sunnis. Saying “Sunni” is like saying “Protestant.” It tells you something, but far from everything. As it turns out, even the Taliban have internal divisions.

For the purposes of this story I need also to point out that there is a difference between a religious conservative and a religious fundamentalist. A religious conservative is simply averse to perceivable change. A fundamentalist could be described as a nostalgic reformer. He looks back to a time long ago (real or imagined) when his religion was more pure, closer to the original intent of the founder(s). He wants to leapfrog back to the practices of a prior age. Such is the difference between the Sunni Afghan Taliban (conservatives) and the Sunni Arab Wahhabis (fundamentalists) of Al Qaeda.

But let us get back to the late Mullah Dadullah. According to Kabir Mohabbat (hereafter “KM”), Mullah Dadullah was originally a relatively unimportant member of the Taliban hierarchy. Dadullah had, over time, become sympathetic to the religious beliefs and political aims of Osama bin Laden. He had been attempting to increase the importance of bin Laden in Afghanistan and also had wished to increase his influence on the Taliban. As mentioned in my other post, the Taliban have long regarded Osama bin Laden as a liability, not an ally.

Back in December of last year, the U.S. military killed Mullah Aktar Mohammed Osmani, then the Southern Commander of Taliban forces in Afghanistan. According to KM, this was not due to chance or brilliant intelligence work. Dadullah betrayed Osmani, and did so for two reasons: Osmani was pro-western, and Osmani held the position that Dadullah wanted to increase his own power and the power of the pro Al Qaeda faction. Dadullah declared himself commander of Taliban forces Southern Afghanistan, but was not confirmed in this position by Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s supreme leader. As far as the Taliban hierarchy was concerned, the position remained empty.

(A note to those confused by the concept of a “pro-western” member of the Taliban: Remember who financed the Afghan resistance against the Soviets – Ronald Reagan and George Bush Senior.)

The stage was set for conflict between Dadullah and Omar. Dadullah had made two mistakes, the betrayal of Osmani being one of them.

The second mistake was that Dadullah had drifted over into the Al Qaeda/Wahhabi camp and had adopted the terrorist tactics of that organization. KM emphasized the conservative, legalistic nature of the Taliban. They are ferocious fighters, and quite willing to engage foreign troops on their soil in any number of ways, but they are profoundly split with Al Qaeda on the use of terrorism. The Wahhabi Arabs of Al Qaeda have a global, religiously based mission that condones the use of terrorism. The Taliban, although extremely devout, have a more nationalistic agenda focusing on driving out foreign troops and the puppet Karzai government through the use of guerrilla tactics. In fact, the Taliban have been trying to cast their struggle in a more nationalistic, less religious light by making concessions on social issues in the areas under their control.

As a side note, there was nearly a small civil war in Afghanistan back in 1999-2000 when the Wahhabis, who don’t believe in grave markers or worshipping at burial sites, started destroying temples in Afghanistan where Moslem saints were buried. This angered the Taliban, who killed some Wahhabis before the matter was settled.

The kidnapping of two journalists by Al Qaeda, one Italian, one Afghan, and the subsequent execution of the Afghan, was met with almost universal disapproval, both among the Afghan general public and in the Taliban hierarchy. This and other actions, plus the betrayal of Osmani, gave Dadullah the reputation of a loose cannon.

Mullah Omar publicly regretted the loss of Dadullah, but privately blamed him for the betrayal of Osmani and is undoubtedly relieved that he is out of the picture. KM said that he wouldn’t be surprised if Omar personally gave the order for Dadullah to be handed to U.S. forces. As with the death of Osmani, KM said that there had to be more than chance involved.

It is an odd twist that U.S. forces were used to do the dirty work for Al Qaeda in the case of Osmani, and then for the Taliban in the case of Dadullah. It demonstrates a lack of understanding among those in command of U.S. and coalition forces.

In an interesting aside, KM discussed the porosity of the Afghan/Pakistani border. The Pakistani government periodically sends large numbers of soldiers into the Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) along the border in an attempt to prevent Taliban fighters from crossing back and forth. KM laughed at this. First he pointed out that when the Soviets had six divisions and 100,000 Afghan government troops on the border, he and the other anti-Soviet fighters crossed back and forth every day. “The British invented that line,” he said, “It means nothing to the people who live there.” The second point he made was that the Pakistani government was negotiating these incursions into the FATA with the tribal leaders. KM has cousins in the area who have been parties to these negotiations. The Pakistani troop movements and patrols are just window dressing to appease the United States government.

KM called Afghanistan “The place of doom for empires,” and noted that he had predicted that the Soviets would last ten years there. “They lasted eleven. Not bad, eh?” He then predicted that the U.S./European alliance in Afghanistan would last perhaps fifteen years. It looks as if we are headed down the exact same road as the Soviets. We’re fighting a war of attrition that we can’t win against a guerrilla army we can’t engage on our terms to support a government that can’t rule among a people we don’t understand.

Comments

[Nat Clark]

I would like to know more about this story is there a book that I can read about this Mohabbat? As an american soldier who was envolved in the first gulf war I am saddened about the fact that our country is so willing to engage in a war with no end in sight.

[Heretic]

Mr. Clark,
There is no book about Mr. Mohabbat, although I understand that he has one in the works. The only existing writing that references him are a few news articles and blog entries. Follow the link to my other post on him and that will link to yet another article by Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair. That about covers it.
I share your sadness and quote Marine General Smedley Butler: "War is a racket."
MH